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I. INTRODUCTION,
The affirmative action debate appears intractable. On one side,
those employing the "rhetoric of innocence" 1 use contemporaneous
findings of actual discrimination as the gauge that defines victim status.
This rhetoric proclaims affirmative action plans that define eligibility
by group status, rather than by individualized proof of victim status,
both harmful to innocent whites and beneficial to undeserving minori-
ties. In sharp contrast, those employing the "rhetoric of guilt"' contend
that "unconscious racism ' 3 makes it impossible for whites to treat mi-
norities as equals. Under this view, "[b]ecause racial discrimination is
part of the cultural structure, each person of color is subject to it, eve-
* Associate Professor of Law, Lecturer in Government, College of William and Mary. A.B.,
Georgetown University, 1978; J.D., Vanderbilt University, 1982. The Author thanks the political
theory discussion group for its insight on an earlier version of this Article. The Author also thanks
the Vanderbilt Law Review for encouragement to pursue this project. A summer research grant
from the Marshall-Wythe School of Law supported the Author's work on this Article.
1. For a full description of this "rhetoric of innocence," see Ross, Innocence and Affirmative
Action, 43 VAND. L. REv. 297, 299-308 (1990).
2. The term "rhetoric of guilt" is my own invention. It derives from and is a counter to the
"rhetoric of innocence." Parallel construction, however, is not the only purpose served by the use
of this term. Individuals who speak about the "rhetoric of innocence" view this "rhetoric" as incor-
rect, as a smokescreen to unconscious racism, noting that "[w]hen we create arguments, when we
act as rhetoricians, we reveal ourselves by the words and ideas we choose to employ." Id. at 297.
While much of this unconscious racism critique has force, it is important to recognize that those
who criticize the innocence rhetoric also act as rhetoricians.
3. Unconscious racism, as used in this Article, is the term of art used by Professor Charles
Lawrence in his intriguing and important article The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckon-
ing with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. R.v. 317, 328-44 (1987); see also Ross, supra note 1, at
310-15.
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rywhere and at all times."4 Thus, the "rhetoric of guilt" turns the
"rhetoric of innocence" on its head. Whites "generally have benefited
from the oppression of people of color,"'5 whereas minorities are victims
of pervasive racism.
Professor Thomas Ross's Innocence and Affirmative Action' is an
excellent presentation of what I have labeled the "rhetoric of guilt."
Ross argues that the "rhetoric of innocence" serves as a smoke screen to
unconscious racism and hence is a "very dangerous idea which simply
does not belong in the affirmative action debate."7 On this level, Ross's
argument is sound." Ultimately, however, Ross misses the mark. Al-
though the "rhetoric of innocence" is too constrained, the "rhetoric of
guilt" is too expansive. Because unconscious racism cannot be detected
solely through evidence of discriminatory intent, disparate impact be-
comes the talisman of Ross's equality model. But court-imposed dispa-
rate impact analysis is a poor substitute for the "rhetoric of
innocence."9
In order to avoid the pitfalls of these competing rhetorics, a new
investigation of the rhetoric of equality is needed. This investigation
will implicate two central values of equality, namely, the antidis-
crimination principle disfavoring group-conscious decisions10 and the
separation of functions principle that recognizes the breakdown of the
democratic process associated with race-conscious decision making."
The articulation of a position that emphasizes both values will explain
why minorities and nonminorities are deemed similarly situated indi-
viduals, not members of groups, and will reveal a viable middle ground
between the competing rhetorics of innocence and guilt. This middle
ground allows a limited judicial and a broad legislative role to redress
the problems of unconscious racism.' 2 After examining the strengths
and pitfalls of the competing rhetorics, this Article will advance an ar-
gument in support of the middle-ground position.
II. GUILT AND INNOCENCE: A PRELIMINARY AsSESSMENT
Proponents of the rhetorics of innocence and guilt, despite all their
differences, use the same analytic model of compensatory justice to
4. Ross, supra note 1, at 313.
5. Id. at 301.
6. Id. at 297.
7. Id. at 315.
8. See infra note 23 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 22-27 and accompanying text.
10. See infra subpart HI(B).
11. See infra subpart III(A).
12. See infra Part IV.
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gauge the correctness of affirmative action. Rather than justify affirma-
tive action based on such forward-looking reasons as averting racial ten-
sion or increasing diversity,13 the guilt and innocence models limit
affirmative action to the eradication of racial discrimination. Neither
model rejects what the Justice Department under President Reagan
characterized as the "cardinal rule that government may neither favor
nor disadvantage a person solely because of race or ethnicity."'
The difference between the innocence and guilt models lies in their
identification of discrimination. The innocence model rejects theories of
institutional discrimination, draws sharp lines between "equality of op-
portunity" and "equality of results," and demands specific proof of in-
tentional, particularized discrimination for every individual who seeks
race-conscious relief.'5 This demand for specificity is rooted in the be-
lief that racial discrimination and racial imbalance are essentially unre-
lated. According to William Bradford Reynolds, Assistant Attorney
General for Civil Rights during the Reagan years:
[While] much racial bias sadly remains today... the devastating failures of today
are not the civil rights causes that divided a nation and a people in years gone by.
The obvious and not-so-obvious barriers that once marked blacks as inferior and
second-class citizens largely have been eliminated.1
Consequently, because discrimination does not explain imbalance, the
innocence model suggests that our world might be imbalanced natu-
rally. As Harvard sociologist Nathan Glazer stated: "It is a perfectly
sound American path [to assume] that groups are different and will
have their own interests and orientations, but [also to insist] that no
one be penalized because of group membership. .. ."
The guilt model considers the rhetoric of innocence's conception of
discrimination naive and insensitive. For the guilt rhetorician, discrimi-
nation is pervasive and explains the bulk of racial imbalance. Consider
the following example:'$ A zoning board considers a proposal to rezone
a single-family housing area to enable the construction of low-income
housing. The sole focus of debate was a fight between environmentalists
seeking to preserve green space and developers seeking to make a dol-
13. See Sullivan, Sins of Discrimination: Last Term's Affirmative Action Cases, 100 HARV. L.
Rzv. 78, 96-97 (1986); see also Kennedy, Persuasion and Distrust: A Comment on the Affirmative
Action Debate, 99 HARv. L. REv. 1327, 1329-34 (1986).
14. Brief for the United States at 28, Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986)
(No. 84-1340) [hereinafter Wygant Brief].
15. See Fullinwider, Introduction to R. FuLiNwman & C. MILLS, THE MoRAL FOUNDATIONS
OF CIVIL RIGHTS (1986).
16. Reynolds, The Reagan Administration's Civil Rights Policy: The Challenge for the Fu-
ture, 42 VAND. L. RaV. 993, 1001 (1989).
17. Glazer, Is Busing Necessary?, COMMzNTARY, Mar. 1972, at 39, 52.
18. This example derives from Lawrence, supra note 3, at 348-49.
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lar. That racial minorities would be the principal beneficiaries of the
low-income housing was not considered. Proponents of the guilt model
would view this failure affirmatively to consider minority interests a
"selective indifference or misapprehension of costs that occurs entirely
outside of consciousness."19 In other words, by failing to consider psy-
chological theories that explain submerged racism,20 the demand for
proof of discriminatory intent permits race-influenced decision making
to go undetected and unremedied. According to Professor Charles Law-
rence, leading proponent of the guilt model, "[t]raditional notions of
intent do not reflect the fact that decisions about racial matters are
influenced in large part by factors that can be characterized as neither
intentional ... nor unintentional."2 Consequently, the guilt model ar-
gues that discrimination must be understood through disparate impact
and suggests that in the absence of discrimination our world might be
integrated naturally.
The guilt and innocence models are true opposites. The guilt model
sees discrimination when ostensibly neutral government action has a
disparate impact.2 2 The innocence model, in contrast, sees no discrimi-
nation in this scenario. Furthermore, the guilt model sees affirmative
action as a remedy for discrimination. The innocence model, however,
views affirmative action itself as pernicious discrimination.
The choice between the rhetorics of guilt and innocence is ulti-
mately a reflection of one's world view. On one hand, Professors Law-
rence and Ross's critique of the rhetoric of innocence is effective. Their
claim that "there are mental processes of which we have no awareness
that affect our actions and the ideas of which we are aware" is beyond
peradventure.2 3 Consequently, the demand of the rhetoricians of inno-
cence, and the Supreme Court,2' that plaintiffs prove discriminatory in-
19. Id. at 349.
20. Lawrence offers two psychological theories to explain the emergence of ra-
cism-psychoanalytic theory and cognitive psychological theory. Psychoanalytic theory explains
both the presence of racial stereotypes and the lag time between changes in discriminatory behav-
ior and corresponding attitudes. Id. at 331-36. Cognitive theory views "human behavior, including
racial prejudice, as growing out of the individual's attempt to understand his relationship with the
world. . . while at the same time preserving his personal integrity." Id. at 336. Through processes
of categorization, assimilation, and the search for coherence, attitudes are learned tacitly; thus, the
individual is not even aware that he or she has been taught racist beliefs. Id. at 336-39.
21. Id. at 322 (footnote omitted).
22. The guilt model does not extend to all disparities. Disparities not understood in racial
terms are presumably valid. For example, a gasoline tax or bridge toll, while causing greater hard-
ship among the poor, who are disproportionately minorities, is devoid of cultural meaning. Dispari-
ties in employment, education, and housing, however, are understood in racial terms. The guilt
model then is an'impact test with a cultural meaning trigger. See generally id. at 317.
23. Id. at 329.
24. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
[Vol. 44:15
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tent, is troublesome. At the same time, however, there is force to the
claims of Reynolds and other proponents of the rhetoric of innocence
that choice,25 culture, 6 and a "breakdown in both our educational and
our moral systems '2 7 at least partially explain group isolation. For this
reason, effects-based proofs of discrimination are also problematic.
That neither the guilt nor innocence model is completely correct
does not mean that one is forced to choose among these imperfect mod-
els. There are middle-ground solutions,2 and this Article will offer one.
Unlike other middle-ground approaches that are rooted in a substantive
evaluation of the guilt and innocence models, however, this Article of-
fers a solution based on the institutional capacity of the fact finder.
Specifically, this Article will contend that the equality principle-that
like persons be treated alike-cautions against the judiciary's adoption
of an impact standard. At the same time, the equality principle does
not preclude elected government's recognition of unconscious racism.
The explanation for this apparent inconsistency is rooted in the funda-
mental difference between judicial and legislative fact-finding.
III. EQUALITY AND THE LIMITS OF JUDICIAL INTERVENTION
Equality, according to Aristotle, demands that people who are alike
be treated alike, and correlatively, people who are unlike be treated un-
like in proportion to their unlikeness.29 But how do we define likeness
and unlikeness? 0 People are like and unlike in an infinite number of
ways-age, wealth, race, religion, gender, eye color, and so on. How,
then, can we measure whether government is treating likes alike and
unlikes differently? Are methadone users unlike alcoholics with respect
to employability?3' Are business persons who advertise on their own de-
25. See generally Glazer, supra note 17.
26. See generally T. SOWELL, THE ECONOMICS AND PoLrrics OF RACE: AN INTERNATIONAL PER-
sPECTIVE (1983).
27. Reynolds, supra note 16, at 1001.
28. See, e.g., Blumstein, Defining and Proving Race Discrimination: Perspectives on the
Purpose vs. Results Approach from the Voting Rights Act, 69 VA. L. REv. 633 (1983) (advocating
an evidentiary effects test that uses the res ipsa loquitur concept in tort law as a model for identi-
fying purposeful discrimination); Eisenberg, Disproportionate Impact and Illicit Motive: Theories
of Constitutional Adjudication, 52 N.Y.U. L. REv. 36 (1977) (proposing a "causation theory" under
which present disparities proximately caused by prior discrimination would trigger strict review);
Perry, The Disproportionate Impact Theory of Racial Discrimination, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 540
(1977) (advocating heightened rationality review for neutral laws with disproportionate impact).
29. 3 ARISTOTLE, ETHICA NICHOMACHEA 1131a-1131b (W. Ross trans. 1925).
30. For an argument that the subjectivity associated with this determination is suggestive of
the superfluous nature of equality analysis, see Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HA, v. L.
REv. 537 (1982). For a counterargument, see Chemerinsky, In Defense of Equality: A Reply to
Professor Westen, 81 MICH. L. REv. 575 (1983).




livery vehicles different from business persons who advertise by renting
space on delivery vehicles owned by others? 2
As an example, take the case of affirmative action. Defenders of
preferential treatment argue that race- and gender-conscious measures
may be consistent with Aristotle's equality principle. Under this argu-
ment, preferences for minorities over whites, or women over men, treat
unlikes differently. Since unlikes may be treated differently, these pref-
erences are permissible. In contrast, preferences for men over women or
whites over minorities treat likes differently.
For example, when Alan Bakke is denied admission to medical
school because the University of California at Davis reserves slots for
minority students, his different treatment neither would stigmatize him
as racially inferior nor frustrate state efforts to combat historic racial
discrimination."3 In these ways, Alan Bakke is unlike his minority coun-
terparts. Compare this to the University of Texas's denial of admission
in 1946 to Heman Sweatt, an otherwise qualified black applicant, on the
basis of race. Sweatt's educational qualifications are not different from
his white counterparts. Only racial prejudice can explain this difference
in treatment. 4 The argument for the preferential treatment of women
is much the same. Virginia Military Institute's male-only policy per-
petuates negative stereotypes without advancing an important state ob-
jective. Mills College's women-only policy inflicts no real harm on
men.
3 5
Opponents of affirmative action reject these distinctions. The Rea-
gan Administration, for example, persistently argued that race should
play no role in decision making.36 Viewing all race-conscious measures
as abhorrent, William Bradford Reynolds argues, discrimination "can
indeed begin to be discussed largely as a problem of the past ... [how-
ever, if we] continue to view group-oriented social issues as civil rights
issues ... [we] could well find ourselves ... in a racially ordered soci-
ety."37 Under this absolutist ideal of equality, then, minorities and
whites are always alike.
The above arguments reveal that the equality principle, by itself,
does not provide all the tools needed to solve the problem of govern-
32. See Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949) (upholding such line
drawing).
33. See Westen, supra note 30, at 582-83.
34. See id. at 581-82.
35. See Raspberry, How Do You Justify Separate Schools?, Wash. Post, May 25, 1990, at
A21, col. 2.
36. See generally Schwartz, The 1986 and 1987 Affirmative Action Cases: It's All Over but
the Shouting, 86 MICH. L. Rav. 524 (1987).
37. Reynolds, Individualism vs. Group Rights: The Legacy of Brown, 93 YALE. L.J. 995, 1005
(1984).
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ment classification. Instead, equality must work in tandem with other
values. Supreme Court equality decisions reveal two such values-the
separation of judicial and lawmaking functions (separation of functions
principle), and the moral imperative that government should not en-
gage in group-conscious decision making (the antidiscrimination
principle).
Before turning to an analysis of these values, a few words about the
nature of this inquiry are appropriate. As mentioned, the equality prin-
ciple uses a relativistic measure of the propriety of governmental con-
duct. When two individuals are deemed alike or similarly situated,
government cannot draw explicit lines distinguishing them. When two
individuals are deemed unlike or differently situated, government can
draw explicit lines distinguishing them. Indeed, government should
draw appropriate lines distinguishing unlikes. The following chart









This chart illustrates the basic point made above. An equality-based
challenge to governmental action requires explicit line drawing of likes
or the failure to draw lines for unlikes.
The distinction between positive and negative rights, however, ob-
viates the need to consider government's failure to treat unlikes differ-
ently. 8 If the Constitution is understood to be a charter of negative
liberties, as Justice John M. Harlan argued, then the equality guarantee
does not impose "'an affirmative duty to lift the handicap flowing from
differences'. . . To so construe it would be to read into the Constitu-
tion a philosophy of leveling that would be foreign to many of our basic
concepts of the proper relations between government and society." 9
Consequently, while poor and wealthy women are differently situated
with respect to their ability to pay for an abortion, "it simply does not
follow that a woman's freedom of choice carries with it a constitutional
entitlement to financial resources to avail herself of the full range of
38. See generally Currie, Positive and Negative Constitutional Rights, 53 U. CHL L. REv. 864
(1986).
39. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 362 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
1991]
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protected choices. '40 Moreover, while antidiscrimination laws that en-
sure access to public accommodations for handicapped individuals fur-
ther equality,4' the Constitution does not mandate the enactment of
this type of legislation. Finally, in explaining why the state has no duty
to rescue a child victimized by an abusive parent,2 the Court noted
that the due process clause "is phrased as a limitation on the State's
power to act, not as a guarantee of a certain minimum level of safety
and security. . . . [Like other constitutional rights, it] was intended to
prevent government 'from abusing [its] power, or employing it as an
instrument of oppression[.]' ,,4s
The positive-negative rights dichotomy thus immunizes govern-
ment for its failure to recognize unlikeness affirmatively. Government
only runs afoul of the equality principle when it treats likes differently.
Consequently, when courts defer to government line drawing as distinc-
tions among unlikes, the raw power of government is enhanced. In turn,
when the judiciary considers individuals similarly situated, less discre-
tion is available to elected government.
The separation of functions and antidiscrimination principles re-
veal who is similarly and who is differently situated. These values,
therefore, represent the cornerstone of equality analysis.
A. Separation of Functions Principle
The separation of functions principle recognizes that popularly
elected government is the true source of lawmaking. As Judge Richard
Posner notes: "The real 'justification' for most legislation is simply that
it is the product of the constitutionally created political process of our
society. '44 The judiciary's role is to put into effect the legislative will.
The judiciary, however, also ensures that majoritarian government op-
erates within constitutional norms, and hence, may invalidate unconsti-
tutional government action.
The constitutional positioning of the judiciary as simultaneously
subordinate to and master over the legislative process creates the classic
40. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316 (1980).
41. The recently enacted Americans with Disabilities Act, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327
(1990), is such a measure. Under the Act, state and private employers of 15 or more must make
"reasonable accommodations" to otherwise qualified handicapped individuals. Id. § 101, 104 Stat.
330-31.
42. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County, 109 S. Ct. 998 (1989).
43. Id. at 1003 (quoting Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 348 (1985)). For a critique of
Deshaney, see Strauss, Due Process, Government Inaction, and Private Wrongs, 1989 SuP. CT.
REV. 53; Minow, Words and the Door to the Land of Change: Law, Language, and Family Vio-
lence, 43 VAND. L. REv. 1665 (1990).
44. Posner, The Defunis Case and the Constitutionality of Preferential Treatment of Racial
Minorities, 1974 Sup. CT. REv. 1, 29.
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countermajoritarian difficulty. In his classic work, The Least Dangerous
Branch, Alexander Bickel spoke of judicial review as antidemocratic.45
That judicial review is "undemocratic" does not make it inappropriate.
Indeed, Bickel even speaks of the judiciary's need to check legislative
expediency and states that the courts are the branch of government
best suited to "appeal to men's better natures, to call forth their aspira-
tions. 14  The question remains how the judicial branch shapes legisla-
tive characterizations of who is similarly and differently situated, given
the countermajoritarian role of the judiciary in government. Remember:
the courts' depiction of individuals as differently situated protects gov-
ernment line drawing; the courts' labeling of individuals as similarly sit-
uated cabins government regulation.
The answer devised by the Court is a two-tiered classification ap-
proach. 7 Government, for the most part, is presumed trustworthy and
may deem people unlike without intrusive judicial scrutiny. The impor-
tant exception to this rule is classifying persons according to their race,
gender, and other "suspect" traits.4'8 These factors are deemed to reflect
prejudice and antipathy, not legitimate state interests.49 Consequently,
"[w]hen there is proof that a discriminatory purpose has been a moti-
vating factor in the decision, . . . judicial deference is no longer justi-
fied." 50 In such cases, government line drawing is viewed as the unlike
treatment of likes.
The principal emphasis of separation of functions, however, is the
primacy of elected government and the correspondingly narrow role of
judicial review. This is best revealed in the rational basis review of so-
45. A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16-17 (1962). Bickel states:
[W]hen the Supreme Court declares unconstitutional a legislative act[,J . . . it thwarts the
will of the representatives of the actual people of the here and now; it exercises control, not in
behalf of the prevailing majority, but against it. That, without mystic overtones, is what actu-
ally happens . . . and it is the reason the charge can be made that judicial review is
undemocratic.
Id.
46. Id. at 26.
47. The two-tiered approach is much maligned. First, some commentators consider it an in-
appropriate way to decide equality cases. See Gunther, In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a
Changing Court: A Model for Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1972) (stating that the
two-tiered approach is too rigid because it does not allow "modest interventionism"); Karst &
Horowitz, The Bakke Opinions and Equal Protection Doctrine, 14 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 7 (1979)
(stating that the two-tiered approach pays too much attention to standard of review and too little
attention to matters of substance). Second, some commentators have demonstrated that interest
balancing, not a principled application of two-tier review, best explains equality decision making.
See Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943 (1987); Ortiz, The
Myth of Intent in Equal Protection, 41 STAN. L. REv. 1105 (1989).
48. Palmore v. Sidotti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984).
49. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
50. Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-66 (1977).
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cial and economic legislation.5 1 Rational basis review reveals the Court's
willingness to ascribe legitimating rationales to seemingly arbitrary
classifications.5" Additionally, it emphasizes that incorrect legislative
fact-finding and suspect legislative purposes do not render a statute un-
constitutional, as long as the legislature's stated rationale is theoreti-
cally legitimate."' Finally, rational basis review enables government
attorneys to subvert actual legislative purpose by offering plausible post
hoc justifications for government actions.5
The inevitability of legislative classification and the impropriety of
judicial lawmaking afford underlying rationales for rational basis re-
view. 55 A classic statement of the judiciary's trust in majoritarian gov-
ernment is Vance v. Bradley:5  "The Constitution presumes that,
absent some reason to infer antipathy, even improvident decisions will
eventually be rectified by the democratic process and that judicial in-
tervention is generally unwarranted no matter how unwisely we may
think a political branch has acted. '57 Moreover, the Court is an inap-
propriate forum for the determination of complex factual questions in-
volved in constitutional adjudication because of the nature of the
judicial process. 8
Even though rational basis review enables government to envision a
world of unlikes in its line drawing, this does not mean that governmen-
51. See Devins, Appropriations Redux, 1988 DuKE L.J. 400-06.
52. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (validating law requiring optom-
etrist's prescriptions for opticians to fit old glasses into new frames while exempting sellers of
ready-to-wear glasses).
53. See Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981) (upholding "environ-
mental" law prohibiting sale of milk in plastic nonreturnable containers despite evidence both of
intent to harm out-of-state producers and of harmful environmental effects of legislation).
54. See United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980) (upholding pension
disability classification despite evidence that law subverted intended purpose).
55. As the Supreme Court stated in New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer:
When a legal distinction is determined. . . between night and day, childhood and maturity,
or any other extremes, a point has to be fixed or a line has to be drawn .... Looked at by
itself without regard to the necessity behind it the line or point seems arbitrary. It might as
well or nearly as well be a little more to one side or the other. But when it is seen that a line
or point there must be, and that there is no mathematical or logical way of fixing it precisely,
the decision of the legislature must be accepted unless we can say that it is very wide of any
reasonable mark.
440 U.S. 568, 593 n.41 (1979) (quoting Louisville Gas Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32, 41 (1928)
(Holmes, J., dissenting)) (emphasis added).
56. 440 U.S. 93 (1979).
57. Id. at 97 (footnote omitted).
58. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 247-48 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part). This concept received positive expression in Arlington Heights: "[B]ecause legis-
lators and administrators are properly concerned with balancing numerous competing
considerations[,] . . . courts refrain from reviewing the merits of their decisions. . . ... 429 U.S. at
265.
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tal line drawing is immune from constitutional attack. 9 It does suggest,
however, that concerns about separation of functions limit the breadth
of suspect governmental line drawing. The Court's reluctance to find a
classification suspect, as well as the Court's cramped view of what con-
stitutes a discriminatory classification, confirms this latter proposition.
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.6 0 illustrates the
Court's reluctance to expand heightened review beyond classifications
based on race, gender, alienage, and illegitimacy. In reviewing the con-
stitutionality of a zoning exemption of homes for "the insane or feeble-
minded,"61 the Court in Cleburne rejected arguments that laws discrim-
inating against the mentally retarded are suspect. The Court accorded
little weight to both the immutability of mental retardation and the
introduction of overwhelming evidence demonstrating pernicious dis-
crimination against the retarded.6 2 Instead, the Court noted that some
classifications according to mental retardation are rational,63 and that
antidiscrimination legislation protecting the mentally retarded reveals
that the mentally retarded are not without political power.6 4
This reasoning is extremely restrictive. Immutability concerns are
negated by the fact that the classification can be related to a legitimate
governmental purpose. 5 Indeed, under the Court's standard in
Cleburne, gender, illegitimacy, and alienage might not constitute sus-
pect classifications. In prior cases, the Court has found that all three
classifications serve important governmental interests. 6 Also, with re-
spect to all three classifications, the government has enacted antidis-
crimination legislation.6 7 Following the Cleburne standard, political-
59. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
60. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
61. Id. at 436 n.6.
62. Id. at 461-65 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (chronicling dis-
crimination against the mentally impaired).
63. Id. at 442-43.
64. Id. at 443-45.
65. When immutability is "often relevant to legitimate purposes," legislative line drawing
with respect to immutability does not necessarily render such government action suspect. J. ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 150 (1980). The question remains, however, whether government over-
whelmingly furthers legitimate purposes through such line drawing. If not, the plausibility of legit-
imate line drawing is rebutted by the actuality of pernicious purpose. In other words, the prospect
of legitimate line drawing should not cloak the reality of irrational discrimination. Cleburne, be-
yond pointing to the prospect of rational discrimination, does not pursue this line of inquiry.
66. See Roestker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (upholding male-only draft); Ambach v.
Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979) (upholding citizenship requirement for public school teachers); Lalli v.
Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978) (upholding precondition of a court order of filiation on intestate inheri-
tance of nonmarital children).
67. See Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1324b (1988) (alienage); Act of Oct. 31,
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988)) (gender); TENN. CoDE
ANN. § 36-2-208 (1984) (illegitimacy).
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disfranchisement concerns in these cases evaporate with the passage of
antidiscrimination legislation.
Cleburne's narrowness is rooted in the Court's increasing sensitiv-
ity to separation of functions concerns. In addition to finding rational
discrimination and the prospect of political representation present in
Cleburne, the Court also gave weight to the "general rule. . . that leg-
islation is presumed to be valid,"6 8 and to the related pragmatic concern
that if the mentally retarded were deemed suspect, then the Court
would be hard pressed "to find a principled way to distinguish a variety
of other groups who have perhaps immutable disabilities. . . and who
can claim some degree of prejudice from at least part of the public at
large. 16 The Court, then, is quite hesitant to let the genie of legislative
distrust out of the bottle of presumptive validity.
The Court's explication of what constitutes a discriminatory classi-
fication sends a similar message. With few exceptions, 0 Court holdings
suggest that unless government uses a forbidden word-race, gender,
and so on-the statute or regulation is not deemed facially improvident.
Consequently, although a fair housing ordinance that requires voter ap-
proval of certain group-conscious regulations governing real estate
transactions is an impermissible racial classification, 1 the Court found
perfectly acceptable a state constitutional provision prohibiting state
construction of low-rent housing unless first approved in a community
election.72 Even more striking was the Court's holding that a law ex-
cluding pregnancy-related disability from a state disability insurance
program was not considered a gender classification because the "pro-
gram does not exclude anyone from benefit eligibility because of gender
but merely removes one physical condition-pregnancy-from the list
68. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440.
69. Id. at 445-46. The Court also added that "[o]ne need mention in this respect only the
aging, the disabled, the mentally ill, and the infirm. We are reluctant to set out on that course,
and we decline to do so." Id. at 446 (emphasis added).
70. The most recent exception is Washington v. Seattle School Dist., 458 U.S. 457 (1982), in
which the Court invalidated a state initiative prohibiting school boards from requiring students to
attend schools not nearest to or next nearest to their homes. While the law speaks of neighborhood
schools and not race-related busing, the Court-pointing to numerous nonracial exceptions to the
neighborhood schools policy-concluded that the Washington law was race specific. Id. at 470-84.
In contrast, the Court-on the day Seattle was issued-labeled race neutral an amendment to the
California Constitution prohibiting state courts from ordering mandatory pupil assignments unless
necessary to remedy the federal equal protection clause. Crawford v. Board of Educ., 458 U.S. 527
(1982). For an examination of these cases, see Sunstein, Public Values, Private Interest, and the
Equal Protection Clause, 1982 Sup. CT. RFv. 127. Another .neighborhood school case is Austin In-
dep. School Dist. v. United States, 429 U.S. 990 (1976) (mei.), in which the Court upheld a neigh-
borhood school policy whose foreseeable and ine,.itable effect was racial isolation.
71. See Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
72. James v. Valitera, 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
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of compensable disabilities. '7 - In plain terms, while the pregnancy ex-
clusion only affects women, some women never become pregnant. The
class of unaffected, thus, includes men and women; for the Court, the
program was not defined along. gender lines. This failure to deem preg-
nancy a surrogate for gender seems, to say the least, a stretch.74 It also
suggests that the Court envisions itself as a limited countermajoritarian
check.
The separation of functions principle helps to explain the Court's
use of a two-tiered classification approach, its hesitancy to label a clas-
sification suspect, and its disinclination to find legislation group spe-
cific. Since individuals are considered similarly situated only when a
classification is found suspect, separation of functions limits the invoca-
tion of suspect class criteria, and as a result, heightened review. There-
fore, separation of functions empowers government by authorizing the
identification of individuals as unlikes. At the same time, separation of
functions treats people as likes with respect to suspect criteria and dis-
favors government line drawing on the basis of race, gender, alienage,
and illegitimacy.
B. Antidiscrimination Principle
The antidiscrimination principle disfavors all race-dependent deci-
sion making.75 While the antidiscrimination principle does not prohibit
race-dependent action,"8 it demands that such government action pass
strict scrutiny's compelling interest and least restrictive means require-
ments.7 7 For the most part, this rigorous test is satisfied only by racial
classifications that remedy discrimination. 8
By disfavoring race-dependent line drawing, the antidiscrimination
principle holds that individuals cannot be deemed unlikes on racial
grounds. In the words of Justice John Paul Stevens: "Persons of differ-
73. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496 n.20 (1974).
74. For a criticism of Geduldig, see Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Cul-
ture, Courts, and Feminism, 7 WoMEN's RTs. L. REP. 125 (1982).
75. See generally Blumstein, supra note 28, at 638-43; Brest, Foreword: In Defense of the
Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARv. L. REv. 1, 1-12 (1976); Strauss, The Myth of Colorblind-
ness, 1986 Sup. CT. REv. 99, 116-30 (explanation and critique). Race-dependent decisions are those
"that would have been different but for the race of those benefited or disadvantaged by them."
Brest, supra, at 6.
76. Professor Paul Brest, however, argues that race-dependent decisions which "disadvan-
tage" racial minorities are prohibited by the antidiscrimination principle. Brest, supra note 75, at
2.
77. The Supreme Court does not uniformly adhere to this value. See infra notes 136-43 and
accompanying text.
78. One exception to this rule are the Japanese internment and curfew cases, Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), and Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943). Another
exception is federal affirmative action policy. See infra notes 124-35 and accompanying text.
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ent races, like persons of different religious faiths and different political
beliefs, are equal in the eyes of the law."'79 As such, the antidiscrimina-
tion principle is a limitation on the exercise of governmental power. It
would be incorrect, however, to argue that the antidiscrimination prin-
ciple is in tension with the governmentally empowering nature of the
separation of functions principle. Separation of functions, as the prior
discussion reveals, accords no deference to racial classifications. Unlike
generalizations about age, drug use, or professional status, generaliza-
tions about race are presumed to be a smoke screen for illegitimate dis-
crimination.80 At this level, the antidiscrimination principle is
responsive to defects in the political process. 1
This process-defects justification is one of two fundamental ratio-
nales for the antidiscrimination principle. The second rationale is that
the antidiscrimination principle promotes individual self-worth, a cor-
nerstone of liberal democracy. This justification, as Professor James
Blumstein notes, sees racial discrimination as a "'particularized wrong'
independent of the adverse consequences that flow from it because
race-based decision making violates the societal goal of a fair, individu-
alized, and meritocratic procedural framework for decision making.
82
In other words, assumptions of differences in moral worth" are anath-
ema to a society premised on free will and individual accomplishment.8 4
Such assumptions, as Professor Michael Perry argues, encourage racial-
ism because they deal with persons of other races not as individuals,
but as "blacks," "whites," and so forth. 5 Racialism both perpetuates
discrimination and encourages a racial spoils system whereby our "na-
tion of minorities" fights over the distribution of government largesse
along racial lines.86
The antidiscrimination principle is accepted generally, yet can be
extremely controversial. When it comes to race-dependent decision
making that is deemed harmful to minorities, like the antimiscegena-
tion law struck down in Loving v. Virginia,87 and racial segregation in
79. Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 650 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
80. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
81. See Brest, supra note 75, at 6-8.
82. Blumstein, supra note 28, at 638-39 (quoting Fiss, Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. Cm. L.
REv. 235, 243 (1971)).
83. Brest, supra note 75, at 10.
84. My colleague Rod Smolla offers an alternative characterization of this rationale, namely,
free market social Darwinism. Social Darwinism, rather than emphasizing individual accomplish-
ment, points out "that all persons are not in fact equal in their talent, creativity, beauty, strength,
intellectual ability, enterprise, or ambition." Smolla, In Pursuit of Racial Utopias: Fair Housing,
Quotas, and Goals in the 1980's, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 947, 960 (1985).
85. Perry, supra note 28, at 550.
86. See Smolla, supra note 84, at 962-63.
87. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
[Vol. 44:15
THE RHETORIC OF EQUALITY
public schools, no one disagrees that the antidiscrimination principle
serves as a bar to such government action. When it comes to so-called
preferential discrimination, however, the consensus breaks down. In-
stead, fundamental questions arise as to both the universal application
of the antidiscrimination principle and the determination of what con-
stitutes discrimination.
The universality of antidiscrimination as a bar to stigmatizing race-
conscious decision making is evidenced by the ease with which the
Court decided Palmore v. Sidotti.s8 Palmore considered the propriety
of private prejudice as a factor in the determination of the child's best
interests in a custody battle. Specifically, a state judge concluded that a
custodial parent could lose custody solely because of her remarriage to
an individual of another race. The trial court concluded that private
biases inevitably would make the child suffer from social stigmatiza-
tion.89 In its unanimous reversal of the state ruling, the Court held that
government cannot give effect to private biases. The trial court's factual
determination of best interest, though possibly correct, was simply ir-
relevant.90 The Court concluded that the Constitution neither can con-
trol such prejudices nor can it tolerate them. 1
Before turning to the question of affirmative action, it is important
to examine the connection between antidiscrimination cases like Pal-
more, Loving, and Brown v. Board of Education92 and Supreme Court
jurisprudence on the question of what constitutes discrimination. Does
requiring proof of discriminatory intent accord with the antidiscrimina-
tion principle's embrace of individual self-worth? Washington v. Da-
vis,9 3 the 1976 ruling that rejected the disparate impact theory of equal
88. 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
89. Id. at 431.
90. The Court concluded that "the reality of private biases and the possible injury they
might inflict are [im]permissible considerations for the removal of an infant child from the custody
of its natural mother." Id. at 433.
91. Id. In a fascinating reading of Palmore, Professor David Strauss argues that it is the
Supreme Court, not the state court, that mandates race-dependent decision making. In making
this point, Strauss offers the following hypothetical: A judge is presented with two custody cases in
which she-through a crystal ball-knows that the child is best off with his father but nothing
else. In one case, race explains why the child's best interests are with the father. In the other case,
race is irrelevant. Under Palmore, despite the judge's ignorance of explanatory variables, one of
her best interest determinations will be overturned. The reason is that the judge-looking only at
outcomes-did not take race into account. Strauss, supra note 75, at 104-05. This argument, while
provocative, is not viable. Judges look at facts, not crystal balls, in determining custody. Palmore
eliminates race from the list of permissible facts. In this sense, race is different from other factors.
As a result, outcomes may change. Contrary to Strauss, the reason why the judge's outcome-fo-
cused opinion is affirmed in one case and reversed in the other is that race is not being considered
by those who otherwise would make (consciously or unconsciously) race-dependent decisions.
92. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
93. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
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protection in favor of an intent standard, is emblematic of the Court's
approach to this question. Davis concerned a challenge by black appli-
cants who were not accepted into the Washington, D.C. police force.
The crux of this challenge was the department's utilization of a verbal
skills test, which a disproportionate number of blacks failed. In re-
jecting the challenge, the Court emphasized the impossibility of distin-
guishing between unsuccessful black and unsuccessful white applicants.
Neither black nor white applicants who failed successfully could claim
that the test denied them equal protection. In other words, had Davis
concluded that only blacks could challenge the use of the exam, blacks
and whites would not be viewed as similarly situated individuals; in-
stead, they would be viewed as members of a group.
At this most basic level, there is a fundamental congruity between
the antidiscrimination principle of Palmore, Loving, and Brown, and
the discriminatory intent requirement. Both constructs are rooted in
the belief that blacks and whites are individuals similarly situated.
Both constructs reject the notion of membership in dissimilarly situ-
ated groups. Palmore, Loving, and Brown find race-dependent decision
making impermissible precisely because such action tends to transform
individual self-worth into group status. Davis refuses to consider group-
based impact proof of discrimination for identical reasons. 5
The commonality between the intent and nondiscrimination re-
quirements should not be construed as a complete adoption of the
Court's discriminatory intent jurisprudence. 6 First, Davis seems more
concerned about the consequences of impact-based proofs of discrimi-
nation than the antidiscrimination roots of intent. For example, the
Court in Davis expresses concern over the "far-reaching" consequences
of impact-based proofs extending to tax, welfare, public service, regula-
tory, and licensing statutes that burden the poor and the average black
more than the more affluent white.9 7 This emphasis on interest balanc-
ing obfuscates the Court's antidiscrimination holding. Second, the elab-
oration of the intent requirement in Village of Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Development Board98 seems overly constraining. Under
Arlington Heights, once a plaintiff shows that pernicious discrimination
was a motivating purpose of government action, the governmental unit
94. Id. at 246.
95. Id.
96. For criticisms of Davis, see Eisenberg, supra note 28; Lawrence, supra note 3; Perry,
supra note 28; and Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. CH. L. REV.
935 (1989); see also Brest, supra note 75, at 29 (rejecting disparate impact proofs, but arguing that
impact may be used "selectively" to create a "rebuttable" presumption of discriminatory intent).
97. Davis, 426 U.S. at 248 (footnote omitted).
98. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
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still can avoid liability by showing, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that it would have undertaken the same action for nondiscriminatory
reasons.9 This standard is too lax. It is next to impossible to tell
whether discriminatory motives entered into the weighing of nondis-
criminatory purposes. For example, a discriminatory zoning board may
place greater weight on aesthetic concerns of overcrowding in rejecting
a multi-unit, low-income housing project than a nondiscriminatory
board. The preponderance of evidence standard, then, runs the risk of
letting ostensibly neutral purposes cloak discriminatory motives,
thereby frustrating the antidiscrimination principle.100 A more rigorous
"clear and compelling" evidentiary standard would better advance an-
tidiscrimination objectives.101
Imperfections in discriminatory intent doctrine do not negate the
fundamental similarity between the antidiscrimination principle and
discriminatory intent case law. There is, however, a perceived tension
between these two principles. Why? The answer undoubtedly is that
Palmore, Brown, and Loving invalidate governmental conduct, whereas
Davis and Arlington Heights validate governmental action. Opposite
results, however, do not necessitate conflicting reasoning. Palmore,
Brown, and Loving address government attempts to treat likes dissimi-
larly, thus violating the equality principle. In contrast, the intent cases
involve neutral statutes that treat likes similarly,1 0 2 thus making the
rulings consistent with the equality principle.10 3
99. Id. at 270 n.21.
100. The Bush Administration and the Congress concurred on this matter, for both versions
of the Civil Rights Act of 1990 have provisions ensuring employer liability whenever "invidious
discrimination was a [not the] motivating factor." Bush Veto Message to the Senate at 1, Oct. 22,
1990.
101. This standard is to be distinguished from the so-called Keyes presumption used in
school desegregation cases. Under the rationale of Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973),
once discriminatory purpose is demonstrated in a significant part of the system, all disparities are
presumed the result of discrimination. Id. at 208. The presumption can be rebutted only by show-
ing that "segregative intent was not among the factors that motivated their actions." Id. at 210. In
the Arlington Heights context, Keyes apparently suggests that, once there is some evidence of
discriminatory purpose, the governmental actor can avoid liability only by demonstrating that race
could not have entered into the decision-making process. This suggestion is incorrect. Proof of
discriminatory purpose-presumably under Arlington Heights-is prerequisite to the triggering of
the Keyes presumption. Arlington Heights, then, deals with the threshold issue of whether any
discrimination exists; Keyes's concern is how to measure the sweep of proven discrimination.
102. Charles Lawrence, however, argues that these purportedly neutral statutes are in fact
rooted in unconscious racism. See infra notes 146-50.
103. There is an element of irony here. It was suggested earlier that government power is
limited by viewing minorities and nonminorities as similarly situated. See supra text accompany-
ing notes 38-43. It is now contended, however, that government does not violate equality through
neutral statutes. In other words, since government typically enacts neutral laws, does not the char-
acterization of minorities and nonminorities as likes empower government? There are two answers
here. First, even if minorities and nonminorities are unlikes, government is under no obligation to
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The intent standard seems consistent with the antidiscriminatory
demand that to treat any person less well than another, or to favor one
any more than another, because they are black or white or brown or red
is wrong.10 The same cannot be said of race-dependent decision making
that serves the public good by promoting diversity or some other for-
ward-looking policy objective. If minorities and whites are similarly sit-
uated with respect to race, distinctions between the benign and
pernicious use of race are senseless. Alexander Bickel, in an oft-quoted
passage by the Reagan Justice Department, 10 5 argues:
The lesson of the great decisions of the Supreme Court and the lesson of contempo-
rary history have been the same for at least a generation: discrimination on the
basis of race is illegal, immoral, unconstitutional, inherently wrong, and destructive
of democratic society. Now this is to be unlearned and we are told that this is not a
matter of fundamental principle but only a matter of whose ox is gored.108
Race-dependent decision making, however, cannot be rejected out
of hand as inconsistent with the antidiscrimination principle. Compen-
satory justice demands that an individual wronged by pernicious dis-
crimination be entitled to compensation adequate to remedy the wrong
suffered. 0 7 Otherwise, perpetrators of discrimination will suffer no pen-
alty for their racist conduct. Moreover, if effective remedies cannot
serve as a disincentive to outrageous conduct, racists will not curb their
conduct and the antidiscrimination principle will be subverted. Given
the antidiscrimination principle's emphasis on discouraging racist con-
duct, wrongdoers should not be relieved of remedial obligations simply
because it is impossible to locate an "actual victim" of discrimination.
Thus, remedial discrimination that either compensates for past wrongs
suffered or deters future racial conduct is consistent with the antidis-
crimination principle.
The question remains where to draw the line separating permissi-
ble remedial discrimination and impermissible race-dependent decision
making. Granted, as the school desegregation cases demonstrate, class-
based wrongs warrant class-based remedies. 0 8 At the same time, unless
treat unlikes differently. See id. Second, while government may typically enact neutral laws, raw
government power is at its apex when it may treat people as unlikes. Witness the antimiscegena-
tion law at issue in Loving and the segregation of education and public accommodations. Indeed,
the fact that government now enacts neutral laws is a testament to the constraining of governmen-
tal power through the characterization of minorities and nonminorities as similarly situated.
104. Van Alstyne, Rites of Passage: Race, the Supreme Court and the Constitution, 46 U.
CH. L. REv. 775, 810 (1979).
105. See Reynolds, supra note 16, at 1001; Wygant Brief, supra note 14, at 11.
106. A. BiCKEL, THE MoRALITY OF CoNsENT 133 (1975).
107. As expressed in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803): "The very essence of
civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws,
whenever he receives an injury." Id. at 163.
108. See Devins, School Desegregation Law in the 1980's: The Courts' Abandonment of
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discrimination explains all disparities, the values of antidiscrimination
would be undermined by the utilization of disparate impact mea-
sures.10 9 For this reason, imbalance caused by societal discrimination is
an inadequate basis for remedial discrimination. "Remedies" for socie-
tal discrimination neither compensate victims nor punish wrongdoers."10
For the most part, Supreme Court affirmative action decision mak-
ing follows the above analysis. Societal discrimination and noncompen-
satory justifications for race-dependent decision making generally have
been rejected as "too amorphous,""' as having "no logical stepping
point,""' 2 and as being inconsistent with the Brown antidiscrimination
mandate."13 Moreover, like the pernicious discrimination struck down in
Brown, Loving, and Palmore, benign discrimination generally must sat-
isfy strict scrutiny's demand of compelling interest and least restrictive
means."
4
The impossibility of reconciling disparate impact or societal dis-
crimination with the antidiscrimination principle cabins the use of race
to cases in which one can identify either the victim or the perpetra-
tor. 15 This is hardly troublesome since the antidiscrimination princi-
ple-by viewing minorities and nonminorities as similarly situated with
respect to race-disfavors race-dependent decision making.
IV. SEPARATION OF FUNCTIONS AND ANTIDISCRIMINATION
RECONSIDERED: TOWARD A MIDDLE GROUND
Separation of functions and antidiscrimination analyses infuse into
the equality principle the value that minorities and whites are alike.
Brown v. Board of Education, 26 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 7 (1984).
109. See supra notes 25-27, 93-95 and accompanying text.
110. As Paul Brest stated:
[A]n individual's moral claim to compensation loses force as the nature, extent, and conse-
quences of the wrongs inflicted become harder to identify and as the wrongs recede into the
past. Not only does the image blur as the focus shifts from a specific claim based on an
identifiable act to encompass amorphous wrongs, but new kinds of claims [e.g., economic ex-
ploitation and other social injustices] enter the field of vision.
Brest, supra note 75, at 42.
111. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 276 (1986); cf. Metro Broadcasting, Inc.
v. F.C.C., 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990) (stating that diversity may be an adequate justification for con-
gressionally mandated affirmative action).
112. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 275.
113. Id. at 276.
114. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706, 721 (1989) (advocating propri-
ety of strict scrutiny review in evaluating state affirmative action efforts).
115. Nonvictims-consistent with the Constitution-may receive relief in cases in which no
less race-specific measure is available to punish the wrongdoer. United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S.
149, 183-84 (1987). Title VII also permits nonvictim relief in the analogous case of persistent egre-




Separation of functions reinforces this alikeness by recognizing that ra-
cial classifications rebut the presumption of governmental trustworthi-
ness.116 Antidiscrimination travels a different road, emphasizing
individual self-worth. 1 7
When classifications harm minorities, the separation of functions
and antidiscrimination principles both speak to the rejection of this
governmental action as improperly treating likes unlike. Separation of
functions and antidiscrimination also disfavor the use of impact tests as
a measuring stick of pernicious discrimination. Separation of functions
emphasizes that impact standards improperly presume illicit govern-
ment purpose without forming an adequate evidentiary basis.' 18 An-
tidiscrimination views impact tests as improperly treating individuals
as members of racial groups." 9 While unconscious racism may reveal
the inadequacy of intent, impact tests prove too much by assuming ra-
cism to be the likely cause of racial imbalance. Consequently, if uncon-
scious discrimination is but one of several causes of racial isolation, an
impact standard demands nonremedial race-dependent decision making
(in contravention of antidiscrimination values) premised on a distrust
of government (in contravention of separation of functions values).
Separation of functions and antidiscrimination values diverge on
the remedial discrimination issue. Antidiscrimination limits remedial
discrimination to instances in which there is a proven wrongdoer."'
Separation of functions is not troubled by remedial discrimination. In
the words of Professor John Hart Ely:
When the group that controls the decision making process classifies so as to advan-
tage a minority and disadvantage itself, the reasons for being unusually suspicious,
and, consequently, employing a stringent brand of review, are lacking. A White
majority is unlikely to disadvantage itself for reasons of racial prejudice .... "I
Court affirmative action jurisprudence is a hodgepodge of antidis-
crimination and separation of functions values. When it comes to the
federal government's use of race, separation of functions prevails. "'2 In
stark contrast, however, state and local efforts are measured principally
against an antidiscrimination standard. 2 '
The leading case on federal affirmative action is Metro Broadcast-
116. See supra notes 48-50, 78-81 and accompanying text.
117. See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
118. See supra notes 70-74 and accompanying text.
119. See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
120. See supra text accompanying note 107.
121. Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41U. CHL L. Rav. 723, 735
(1974). For the Reagan Administration's critique, see Wygant Brief, supra note 14, at 16-18.
122. See infra notes 124-35 and accompanying text.
123. See infra notes 136-44 and accompanying text.
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ing, Inc. v. F.C.C.,124 in which a five-member majority upheld Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) efforts to increase minority repre-
sentation in broadcast management through race preferences in the
granting of licenses. 12'5 These preferences were justified both as a rem-
edy for inequities created by racial and ethnic discrimination 2 ' and as
a mechanism for promoting program diversity through increased minor-
ity ownership.1 27 While recognizing that prior cases amply supported
the federal government's use of race to remedy societal discrimina-
tion,2 8 Metro Broadcasting upheld the FCC preference on nonremedial
diversity grounds. Moreover, rather than make use of the strict scrutiny
test typically associated with racial line drawing, the Court ruled that
congressionally mandated "benign"'129 preferences need only be "sub-
stantially related" to "important governmental objectives within the
power of Congress."130
The diversity rationale endorsed in Metro Broadcasting, although
consistent with separation of functions concerns,3 ' clearly subverts an-
tidiscrimination values. Diversity prizes a cross-representation of view-
points and assumes that status-at least "in the aggregate" 132- is a
proxy for the representation of certain views. With respect to the FCC
preference, the diversity rationale presumes that racial status will influ-
ence the programming decisions of black and white license holders. '
In focusing on groups, diversity directly contradicts the ethos of indi-
vidualism that underlies antidiscrimination.
Metro Broadcasting, however, does not signal the death knell of
antidiscrimination in federal race preference cases. First, the availabil-
ity of a remedial justification may have been an important, though un-
stated, consideration in the Justices' reasoning.13' Second, Metro
124. 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990).
125. Id. For an analysis, see Devins, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. F.C.C.: Requiem for a
Heavyweight, 69 TEX. L. REv. 125 (1990).
126. Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3009-10 (quoting H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 765, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess. 43).
127. Id. at 3010.
128. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 476-78 (1980) (upholding a remedial set-aside
enacted by Congress); see also City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706, 717-20 (1989)(discussing and distinguishing Fullilove from set-asides enacted by state and local governments).
129. Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3008.
130. Id. at 3009.
131. For further analysis, see Devins, supra note 125, at 143-44.
132. Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3016.
133. As Justice Sandra Day O'Connor commented in her Metro Broadcasting dissent, the
FCC preference "embod[ies] stereotypes that treat individuals as the product of their race, evalu-
ating their thoughts and efforts-their very worth as citizens-according to a criterion barred to
the government by history and the Constitution." Id. at 3029 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
134. See Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neu-
tral Principles, 96 HARV. L. Rav. 781 (1983) (stating that members of the Court join an opinion for
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Broadcasting is an exception to the rule of federal race preferences
grounded in remedial theory.1 3 5 Third, given the replacement of Justice
William Brennan with Justice David Souter, Metro Broadcasting's slim
majority seems vulnerable. As it stands, however, separation of func-
tions concerns reign supreme in federal affirmative actions efforts.
Court review of state and local affirmative action efforts, although a
hybrid of antidiscrimination and separation of functions values, is prin-
cipally aligned toward antidiscrimination values. On one hand, affirma-
tive action cannot be grounded in societal discrimination or
nonremedial theories.13 6 Moreover, strict scrutiny review is the applica-
ble standard of review.137 On the other hand, the Court rejected the
Reagan Justice Department's strident advocacy of strict compensatory
justice. Specifically, in the Court's view, a plan need not be limited to
remedying specific instances of identified discrimination for it to be
"narrowly tailored," or "substantially related," to the correction of prior
discrimination.138
Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education139 is the Court's principal
statement on this question.1 40 At issue in Wygant was an affirmative
action plan that used the black-white student population ratio as a tar-
get for the hiring and layoffs of minority and nonminority teachers. The
Court found reliance on black-white population ratios to be an inappro-
priate basis for race-conscious action. Instead, remedial action must be
warranted; that is, there must be sufficient evidence to justify the con-
clusion that there has been prior discrimination, and that the employer
is the wrongdoer. 141 Failure to meet these requirements, the Court con-
tended, would undermine "a core purpose of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment" to alleviate all governmentally imposed race distinctions.1 4'2 In
explaining the type of employer proof required to show that remedial
action was necessary, the Court suggested proof of a discrepancy in the
relevant labor market between qualified minority hires and qualified
numerous reasons and hence the Court may not subscribe to a case's stated rationale in future
decisions).
135. See, e.g., Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 476-78.
136. See supra notes 111-19 and accompanying text. In the Supreme Court's lead opinion in
Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (plurality decision), Justice Lewis
Powell suggested that first amendment academic diversity warrants the consideration of race as a
factor in a university's admission decision. Id. at 311-16 (opinion of Powell, J.). Since no other
member of the Court joined it, the Powell opinion does not speak for the Court on this issue.
137. See supra notes 111-19 and accompanying text.
138. Wygant v. Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 287 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
139. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
140. The Court's recent decision in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706
(1989), derives almost entirely from Wygant. See Devins, supra note 115, at 372-78.
141. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 277.
142. Id. (quoting Palmore v. Sidotti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984)).
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nonminority hires.143 In other words, Wygant rejected a contemporane-
ous findings requirement in favor of limited numerical proof. Wrongdo-
ing, then, can be inferred through disparities, not direct proof.
Wygant's utilization of the relevant labor market is a merger of
antidiscrimination and separation of functions values. The separation
of functions is advanced because government is empowered voluntarily
to remedy its own race discrimination. This advancement of separation
of functions also speaks to a principled relaxation of the antidiscrimina-
tion principle's hostility to impact. While antidiscrimination disfavors
numerical proofs of discrimination, it also favors the remedial use of
race-dependent decision making when there is a proven wrongdoer. Un-
like black-white population disparities whose presumption of wrongdoer
and victim status are little more than a call for racial justice, the line
drawn by the relevant labor market approach is plausibly related to
wrongdoer status. 144 Given the proof problems associated with uncon-
scious racism, the relevant labor market can be viewed as a device that
takes unconscious racism into account without transforming equal pro-
tection into a pure group construct. The relevant labor market ap-
proach does not subvert the antidiscrimination principle, for it is a
fundamentally remedial measuring stick. Wygant, therefore, is consis-
tent with both separation of functions and antidiscrimination concerns.
The relevant labor market approach, however, is not an equal pro-
tection panacea. First, because unconscious racism prevents minorities
from entering the relevant labor market, this solution is only a partial
cure to the problem of unconscious racism. Second, since it is undoubt-
edly true that some employers will have a disproportionately larger, and
others a disproportionately smaller, share of minority employees, the
relevant labor market's call for a minimum level of minority representa-
tion places an unfair burden on government employers. Under this
view, moreover, the relevant labor market approach may be deemed a
demand for race-dependent decision making; hence, it would be consid-
ered fundamentally at odds with the antidiscrimination principle.
Separation of functions provides a justification for and limitation
on the relevant labor market, which is responsive to this second con-
cern. In cases in which the government chooses to utilize the relevant
labor market as a measure for remedial discrimination, this equity argu-
ment evaporates. Indeed, separation of functions supports such line
143. Id. For a more thorough discussion, see id. at 284-94 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
144. In Title VII litigation, disparities between the percentage of minority hires and the per-
centage of minorities in the relevant labor market do establish a prima facie pattern or practice
claim. See id. at 292 (O'Connor, J., concurring). For this reason, Justice O'Connor argues that the
relevant labor market provides "a firm basis for determining that affirmative action is warranted."
Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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drawing. This is the essence of Wygant.145 In contrast, the utilization of
the relevant labor market cannot be imposed upon unwilling employers.
The equity argument as well as separation of functions concerns both
speak -against such uses of the relevant labor market.
Separation of functions also provides an answer of sorts to the first
objection-that the relevant labor market is an inadequate guard
against unconscious racism. The source of this objection is the failure of
discriminatory intent adequately to explain racism. Take Washington
v. Davis as an example. Professor Charles Lawrence argues that the dis-
parate impact of the entrance examination is presumptively discrimina-
tory because its "historical and cultural context" makes us think of this
disparity in racial terms. 146 Lawrence advances two arguments here.
First, both the differing roles of police in predominantly white and
predominantly black neighborhoods147 and the components of a police
officer's job-"authority, control, protection, and sanctioned vio-
lence"-have racial meaning.14 8 Second, the government's use of a ver-
bal and written skills test that blacks disproportionately fail also has
racial meaning because our culture has taught us to believe that blacks
fail because they are black. 49 This adverse cultural meaning, for Law-
rence, demonstrates the need to assess the propriety of the communica-
tion skills test. If alternative hiring techniques with less disparate
impact exist, unconscious racism is at the root of the disparity. Noting
that the communication skills test undervalues the ability of black of-
ficers to establish rapport in black communities and that white officers
will "need sensitivity training and community relations workshops,"
Lawrence deems the communication skills test discriminatory. 50
The separation of functions and antidiscrimination principles are
not necessarily in conflict with Lawrence's model. Both disfavor race-
dependent decision making, whether conscious or unconscious. Separa-
tion of functions disfavors race-dependent decision making because pre-
sumptive trust is not accorded to these decisions; the antidiscrimination
principle disfavors race-dependent decision making because these deci-
sions undermine individual self-worth. The drawing of lines separating
discrimination from disparate impact is quite another matter. If im-
pact-or impact with stigmatizing cultural meaning-is a surrogate for
intent, then an impact test is consistent with both antidiscrimination
145. See id. at 289-90 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
146. Lawrence, supra note 3, at 370.
147. Id. at 370-71.
148. Id. at 370.
149. Id. at 373.
150. Id. at 375.
[Vol. 44:15
THE RHETORIC OF EQUALITY
and separation of functions principles. 151 If discrimination does not ex-
plain all disparities, antidiscrimination and separation of functions
would be undermined by an impact test."'
In assessing whether discrimination lies at the root of racial dispar-
ities, separation of functions and antidiscrimination values provide
some guidance. Impact analysis pays attention to groups, and thus, it is
not favored by the antidiscrimination principle. Impact analysis is also
distrustful of government, and thus, is not favored by separation of
functions principle. To say that impact analysis is disfavored is not to
say that it is inappropriate. The point, instead, is that absent compel-
ling evidence that impact is a surrogate for intent, judicial imposition of
an impact test is inconsistent with separation of functions and antidis-
crimination values.
Is the door, then, closed on impact analysis? Absolutely not. Sepa-
ration of functions concerns speak against judicial imposition of im-
pact-based measures of discrimination. Determinations by legislative
bodies that discrimination can be measured only by disparate impact
advances separation of functions values. Furthermore, even though an-
tidiscrimination disfavors impact analysis, the principal goal of anti-
discrimination is preventing race-dependent decision making. Conse-
quently, if the identification of race-dependent decision making could
be accomplished only through the utilization of numerical measures of
discrimination, the antidiscrimination principle also would be furthered
by the consideration of disproportionate impact. 153
That elected government, rather than the judiciary, should play a
leadership role in this effort comes as no surprise. Remember, rational
basis review is rooted in legislative fact-finding competence. The 'Su-
preme Court, for example, has recognized that the judicial process is ill-
suited to determine complex factual questions.5
This fact-finding defense typically is associated with rational basis
review. In heightened review cases, however, the fact-finding defense is
subject to question.155 Indeed, the very purpose of heightened review is
151. See supra notes 48-50, 93-95 and accompanying text.
152. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
153. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
154. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. In the words of former Solicitor General
Archibald Cox:
Whether a state law denies equal protection depends to a large extent upon finding and ap-
praisal of the practical importance of relevant facts. . . . There is often room for differences
of opinion in interpreting the available data. A fortiori men may differ upon the values of
competing desiderata. The accepted principle. . . is that the Court should assume that there
are facts which furnish a constitutional foundation ..
Cox, Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARv. L. REV. 91, 106
(1966). This is the separation of functions principle discussed earlier in this Article.
155. See Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91
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to force the government to prove the accuracy of its fact-finding. 56
Moreover, some heightened review cases suggest judicial hostility to
governmental fact-finding. Craig v. Boren,157 for example, refused to
give weight to differential drunken driving arrest statistics introduced
by the state to support a gender-specific classification relating to the
sale of alcohol. Proving broad sociological propositions by statistics is a
dubious business for the Court, and inevitably is counter to the "nor-
mative philosophy that underlies the Equal Protection Clause.' 158 Con-
sequently, the argument continues, rather than limit the judicial role
and defer to legislative fact-finding, the courts should play an activist
countermajoritarian role. This argument does not hold. The determina-
tion of whether unconscious racism warrants use of an impact test is an
appropriate matter for state- and federal-elected branch determination.
With respect to Congress, the fact-finding defense extends to race-
dependent decision making. The source of this power is section five of
the fourteenth amendment, which explicitly authorizes congressional
enforcement of the equality guarantee. 59 Congress, then, could deter-
mine that the inability to read or write in English is an inappropriate
voting precondition because literacy requirements have a disparate im-
pact on Puerto Ricans. e0 Congress also may decide that a race-specific
set aside in a federal public works statute is necessary to remedy dis-
crimination.' 6 ' In support of these decisions, the Court emphasizes Con-
gress's special fact-finding capability."6 '
Authority to enforce the fourteenth amendment also speaks to
Congress's power to supplant the courts." 3 For example, the 1982
HARv. L. REv. 1212, 1234 (1978); see also Estreicher, Congressional Power and Constitutional
Rights: Reflections on Proposed "Human Life" Legislation, 68 VA. L. REV. 333, 356-57 (1982).
156. Heightened review, rather than presuming the veracity of means and ends, demands
that government demonstrate that its ends are important or compelling and the means selected are
substantially related or least restrictive. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
157. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
158. Id. at 204 (emphasis added); see also id. at 208 n.22.
159. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (stating that "[t]he Congress shall have power to en-
force, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article"); see also Metro Broadcasting, Inc.
v. F.C.C., 110 S. Ct. 2997, 3008-09 (1990) (stating that Congress's "mandated" FCC preference is of
"overriding significance").
160. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 653 (1966).
161. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
162. In the voting case, for example:
It was for Congress. . .to assess and weigh the various conflicting considerations-the risk of
pervasiveness of the discrimination in governmental services, the effectiveness of eliminating
the state restriction on the right to vote as a means of dealing with the evil, [and] the ade-
quacy or availability of alternative remedies. ...
Morgan, 384 U.S. at 653.
163. See generally Gordon, The Nature and Uses of Congressional Power Under Section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment to Overcome Decisions of the Supreme Court, 72 Nw. U.L. REV.
656 (1977).
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amendment to the Voting Rights Acts,164 which bars the use of any pro-
cedure that results in the denial or abridgement on account of race of
the right to vote,165 was enacted in response to court decisions mandat-
ing that constitutional race-discrimination case law govern vote dilution
claims.1 66 Perceiving the need for effects analysis to play a larger role in
vote cases, Congress expressed its dissatisfaction with the constitutional
measure of discrimination through legislation.
Another example is Congress's effort to shift, from employee to em-
ployer, the burden of proof in statutory employment discrimination
lawsuits. In 1989 the Supreme Court, in Wards Cove v. Atonio,1 67 be-
cause of "'the myriad of innocent causes that may lead to statistical
imbalances,' "168 imposed a specific causation requirement in employ-
ment discrimination lawsuits."6 ' Congress, perceiving that employers
are better situated to prove their innocence than employees are able to
demonstrate their guilt, passed legislation requiring employers to
demonstrate a "business necessity"170 whenever their personnel prac-
tices resulted in a disparate impact on the basis of race, religion, sex, or
national origin.171
This legislation was vetoed by President Bush,172 and Congress
failed to override this veto.1 78 Although Wards Cove remains the pres-
ent standard, Congress's efforts here again reveal that popular govern-
ment can (and quite possibly will) put into effect a modified version of
Lawrence's proof for unconscious racism.17
164. Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1988)). See
generally Blumstein, supra note 28.
165. Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1988)).
166. The source of these court decisions was Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980), a Supreme
Court decision rejecting a constitutional challenge to at-large elections due to the failure of minori-
ties to win elections. For the Court, since a municipality may prefer at-large over single-district
representation "on grounds apart from race, as would nearly always be true where, as here, an
entire system of local governance is brought into question, disproportionate impact alone cannot
be decisive." Id. at 70.
167. 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989).
168. Id. at 2125 (quoting Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 108 S. Ct. 2777, 2787 (1988)).
169. Id. Specifically, before the burden of persuasion shifts to the employer, employee plain-
tiffs must "demonstrate" that "each challenged [employment] practice has a significantly disparate
impact on employment opportunities for whites and minorities." Id.
170. The Civil Rights Act of 1990, S. 2104, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990). "Business necessity"
is the demand that an employment practice "bear a significant relationship to successful perform-
ance of the job." Id. § 3.
171. Id. § 4.
172. See Devroy, Bush Vetoes Civil Rights Bill, Wash. Post, Oct. 23, 1990, at Al, col. 3.
173. See Dewar, Senate Upholds Civil Rights Bill Veto, Dooming Measure for 1990, Wash.
Post, Oct. 25, 1990, at A15, col. 1.
174. Under Lawrence's test, disparities with cultural meaning demand strict scrutiny review.
Lawrence, supra note 3, at 355-81. The legislation approved by Congress as well as the Bush bill
are less exacting. See supra notes 170-72 and sources cited therein.
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This congressional authority argument, however, does not extend
to state action. Indeed, the Supreme Court has recognized that the
fourteenth amendment "stemmed from a distrust of state legislative en-
actments based on race."'175 Nonetheless, there is reason to defer to
state fact-finding on the issue of intent versus impact. In equality
cases,17 6 the trigger to distrusting legislative fact-finding is the existence
of a suspect classification. The intent-versus-impact debate concerns
the determination of whether the triggering event has occurred. 17 7
Hence, there is reason to think the fact-finding defense still exists. For
those who advocate the rhetoric of guilt, this distinction is problematic:
if unconscious racism exists, the fact-finding defense fails to detect ra-
cist conduct and, therefore, is inappropriate; yet the fact-finding de-
fense makes it impossible to determine whether unconscious racism
exists. To presume unconscious racism exists, however, creates a di-
lemma in the opposite direction. If unconscious racism does not exist,
the fact-finding defense is appropriate; yet presumed unconscious ra-
cism makes it impossible to determine whether the fact-finding defense
is appropriate. Consequently, since the dilemma cuts both ways, the
fact-finding defense holds.
This conclusion is not a preference for a greater evil over a lesser
evil. When faced with a choice rooted in factual uncertainty, separation
of functions values demand that the judiciary accept the fact-finding
defense. Two other considerations support the efficacy of the fact-find-
ing defense. First, the antidiscrimination principle disfavors race-de-
pendent decision making. Consequently, unless the case for impact
rooted in unconscious racism is clear, the fact-finding defense seems
consistent with antidiscrimination values. Second, the fact-finding de-
fense does not foreclose a legislative body from taking steps to prevent
possible unconscious racism. For example, a legislative body sensitive to
175. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706, 720 (1989). Consequently, while the
federal government may remedy societal discrimination by enacting a set-aside restricting federal
contracting dollars to specified minority groups, state or local set-asides must be a narrowly tai-
lored remedy to actual discrimination by the state or local actor. See Devins, supra note 115, at
372-78.
176. In religion, negative commerce, and speech cases, however, disparate effects may lead to
the invalidation of government action. See Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n,
432 U.S. 333 (1977) (holding that disparate impact on out-of-state commerce may trigger strict
scrutiny review of state action); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (holding that the estab-
lishment clause prohibits government action whose principal effect is either the advancement or
inhibition of religion); Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.), stay denied, 436 U.S. 953 (1978)
(holding that issuance of parade permit cannot be made contingent on procurement of liability and
property damage insurance).
177. In other words, while the police entrance exam in Davis is deemed a neutral law under
an intent standard, the entrance exam would fail as pernicious, racist line drawing under an im-
pact standard.
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possible unconscious racism can be responsive to the problems identi-
fied by Professor Lawrence in his critique178 of Washington v. Davis.17
In contrast, if the courts utilize numerical proofs of discrimination, gov-
ernment is without authority to conclude that nondiscriminatory fac-
tors contribute to racial imbalance.
The separation of functions and antidiscrimination values discour-
age judicial cognizance of unconscious racism and empower Congress
and other legislative bodies to take unconscious racism into account.
This seeming incongruity is explained by the impossibility of drawing
perfect lines distinguishing discrimination from impact. It suggests that
the presumption of trust retains validity, and therefore, fact-finding on
this question should be undertaken by the legislature. This indetermi-
nacy also suggests that a legislative body finding that unconscious ra-
cism mandates consideration of impact does not run afoul of the
antidiscrimination principle disfavoring race-dependent decision mak-
ing. If impact is deemed the only device able to detect discrimination,
impact can be used to remedy discrimination. By the same token, a leg-
islative body that finds unconscious racism too sweeping does not vio-
late the antidiscrimination principle. Under this construct, impact
tests-by paying attention to group status-are the evil, not the cure.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article has argued that the rhetorics of guilt and innocence
are not the only ways to understand equality decision making. The
equality principle, infused with the values of antidiscrimination and
separation of functions, provides an alternative view to equality deci-
sion making. Indeed, contrary to Professor Ross's argument, equality
decision making seems shaped more by antidiscrimination and separa-
tion of functions values than by the rhetoric of innocence.
This alternative formulation of equality decision making does not
undermine the attack on the rhetoric of innocence by Professors Ross
and Lawrence. In the hands of the Reagan Justice Department, the
rhetoric of innocence was fitted into a vision of compensatory justice
insensitive to unconscious racism and at odds with both antidiscrimina-
tion and separation of functions values. 80
The rhetoric of guilt equally goes too far. Disparities in employ-
ment, education, and housing may well be caused by factors other than
conscious and unconscious racism. The rhetoric of guilt, then, may run
roughshod over fundamental antidiscrimination and separation of func-
178. See supra notes 146-50 and accompanying text.
179. 426 U.S. 229 (1976); see supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
180. See, e.g., supra notes 107-08 and accompanying text.
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tions values. At the same time, Congress and, to a lesser extent,181 the
states are empowered to respond to unconscious racism through legisla-
tion. Consequently, while not embracing unconscious racism, much
more than a Pyrrhic victory is scored for guilt advocates by the repudi-
ation of the rhetoric of innocence through antidiscrimination and sepa-
ration of functions values.
Admittedly, antidiscrimination and separation of functions values
do not respond directly to the concerns of unconscious racism raised by
Professors Lawrence and Ross. Considering the indeterminacy of defin-
ing where discrimination ends and disparate impact begins, however,
the avoidance of absolutist approaches may be the best available solu-
tion to reconcile the guilt and innocence models. The structural ap-
proach described herein offers a principled, flexible solution to the
problem of racial disparities. Remarkably, it seems to be the solution
advanced by the Court in the bulk of its equality jurisprudence.
181. See supra note 175.
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